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SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS FOR THEIR CREATORS.
The policy of the law is, generally, not to allow a man to
have an estate in personalty or realty, which shall not be subjectable to appropriation by creditors for the payment of their
debts. This policy is pressed so far as to limit a man's power of
alienation. A cannot devise or convey land in fee to B, and at
the same time effectively provide that B's creditors shall not be
able to attach it or levy upon it. Probably A cannot convey to
B an estate for life, or for even a few years, and exempt the estate from such attachment or levy.
But while to so great extent the principle that a man's interests shall not be immune from appropriation by creditors is
carried, a device is strangely tolerated by which important exceptions can be made. In many American States, though not in
England, A can secure to B an interest in land or personalty which
shall be exempt from the grasp of creditors, if only be does not
give the land or personalty directly to him, but gives it to a trustee, and confers on thistrustee control of it; i. e. makes the trust
"active."' If thesame person is selected to exercise the control,
i. e. to be the trustee, who is also to be the beneficiary, the exemption is lost,' except, apparently in what are called sole and
separate uses, in which the conveyance or devise may be made
directly to a woman, for her sole and separate use4 and yet be indivestable by her creditors.
The motive of those who have thus made the law, is, it must
be confessed, occult. Why is A to have the benefit of property
126 Am. and Eng. Encyc. 38; Ghormly v. Smith, 39 Pa. 584.

v. Spear, 45 P.a i68; 22 P. & L. Dig. 38542.
3Ehrisman v. Sener, 162 Pa. 577; 22 P. & L. Dig. 38563.
4
Hays v. Leonard.
2Still
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without molestation of creditors, if only he does not administer
it? What interest can the state have in excluding tbe control of
the beneficiary? What can make it willing to protect property
from creditors, if only the debtor cannot manage it, defend it from
trespass or other wrong, cannot let it, improve it, sell it, and unwilling to protect it, if he has this power?
The fact that when the property is conveyed to B, for the
benefit of A, those who deal with A receive warning before giving him credit, that his interest will not be leviable in execution,
can hardly be the reason for the toleration of undesirable equitable
interests, for it is just as easy to apprise them of their inability
to sieze legal interests. If B is about to give credit to A on the
assumption that A owns a tract of land, he may, if he chooses to
inquire before giving credit, inquire into A's title, and may discover that the deed to him expressly stipulates that the land is
not to be subject to his debts. If the deed is recorded, the record can be easily consulted.- If it is not recorded, it is B's precipitancy or willingness to take chances, that leads him to lend
his money, without compelling the production of the deed.
.Possiblythe explanation of the attitude of the judges is that
while willing to tolerate exemption from execution in a few
cases, they would deprecate it in a large number of cases, and
that so long as they insist on the insertion of a trustee between
the intended beneficiary and the land or chattels, the number of
settlements providing for exemption from liability for debts will
be very small. The reluctance of the ordinary parent to withhold from them control of the property bestowed upon children,
and to confer it upon strangers, will usually induce him to refrain from making such a disposition. Courts and legislatures
may be willing to endure a "spendthrift" feature in one or two
percent of the dispositions of property, while quite unwilling tQ
endure it in twenty or thirty per cent of them. If there is any
other reason for the sufferance of unleviable estates, affected
with trusts, while refusing it to legal estates, it has escaped discovery.
Not only, as we have intimated, may the immunity from
levy and sale in execution be conferred on property held to the
sole and separate use of women who are married or in contemplation of marriage : it may be conferred in any case of a trust if
only the cestui que trust cannot by the terms of the trust manage
the property (that is, if the trust is active) and his estate is for
not more than his lifetime.
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A is permitted to give his land to a stranger, if he wishes to.
He is allowed to give it to this stranger directly; or to give it to
a third person in trust for him, and when A gives it to a third
person in trust for a stranger, he may effectually provide that
neither it nor the income from it shall be susceptible of being taken by the creditors of the cestui que trust. So much
seems assumed in Holdship v. Patterson' and Rees v. Livingston."
If a stranger may be thus secured the advantage of proprietorship without liability for debts, it is of course easy to understand
how a near relative, a brother or sister, a father or mother, a
son or daughter, grand son or grand daughter might. It is
strange that the question ever needed decision, whether such a
trust could be established for a woman. It seems to have been
suspected by counsel, that only men, only prodigal, vicious, insolvent, economically worthless men, could be coddled by friends
and secured in a life even of ease and luxury, despite any debts
which they should have already contracted, when the trust was
created, as well as any which they might subsequently create.
But, Sharswood, J., said, in 1875, "If the beneficiary be a
woman surely the benefactor can protect her from her own debts
and improvidence as well as against the debts and improvidence
of her husband. * * It is true that girls are not so often
spendthrifts as boys, but they may sometimes be, and if extravagance in female dress continues as it has begun, the fortunes of
girls may be as rapidly dissipated in that way, as by intemperance, gambling and licentiousness in young men."" But it is not
necessary that the beneficiary, boy or girl, should be a "spendthrift" in the proper sense of the word. The trust may be created for a child two years old. And mere ignorance, business
inexperience, ill health, bodily or mental of the beneficiary may
motive the formation of the trust, no less than vice and prodigality, or a bankruptcy.
While a mah may thus settle property for the benefit of others,
so as to be beyond the risk of loss through debts, can he similarly
settle it for his own future benefit?
He may be conscious of an instability of purpose and an
unreliability of judgment, of business incapacity, and he may
57 W. 547641 Pa. 113.
T

Ashhurst's Appeal, 77 Pa. 464.

Hughes-Hallett v. Hughes-Hallett,

152 Pa. 590; Cridlard's Estate, 7 Phila. 58.
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desire to protect those who are dependent on him, his wife and
children, from the risks of a futute business. If he is not now
indebted, and is not now embarking on a business in which debts
will probably arise, he may settle his property on a trustee for
the wife and children, so as to be beyond the reach of his future
debts and of theirs; but, if he makes the trust for himself, as
well as for them, he probably cannot validly exempt the property from seizure and sale for debts which he may later contract. 8
If he is the sole beneficiary, or if of a series of beneficiaries, he is
the first for life, and he is followed by others, for life, years or
in fee, the exemption, not merely of the income arising during
his life, but of the corpus of the trust from levy and attachment,
will be void. A conveyed land to B in trust to pay the net rents
to A during his life, land and rents not being liable for debts,
after his death, in trust to hold the land for A's appointees by will;
or, no appointment being made, for such persons as would be
his heirs. It was held that not merely the rents accruing during
A's lifetime but the land itself, or the money obtained from the
sale of it, could be taken in execution for debts contracted by A,
after the settlement', that is, although the trust was in part for
A, and in part for his testamentary appointees or heirs, the
whole subject of the trust, the interest not merely of A but of the
remaindermen, could be taken by creditors. Not merely was
the trust for A during life void, but the conveyance itself to the
trustee, and therefore the trust in favor of the remaindermen,
was void as against creditors."' It is true that in one or two
cases, Arnold, J., held that only the income arising during the
life of the settler, to whom, during his life, it was to be paid,
was liable to attachment and that the corpus or income arising
after his death, was exempt, but this view must be regarded as
over-ruled by the cases just considered. If even the corpus may
8in Ghormly v. Smith, 139 Pa. 584, occurs a remark concerning making

himself the "sole beneficiary for life," from which however cannot be safely
inferred that the exemption would be valid, if others were united with
the settler or beneficiaries. However in Snyder v. Christ 39 Pa. 499, a voluntary conveyance to a trustee by A, in trust for himself and wife for life,
remainderto children, was treated as valid against future creditors.
'Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330; Barber v. Snyder, 17 Mont. 195.
"The same is held in Patrick v. Bingaman, 2 Super. 113, where both
income arising during the life of the life cestui que trust and a portion of
the corpus were attached. Catherwood's Estate, 29 W. N. C. 344.
"Murphy v. Solms, 6 Pa. C. C. 264; Andrews v. Lewis, i Pa. C. C. 293.

THE FORUM

269

be taken by creditors, although the trust secures to the settler
only the income, during his lifetime, it cannot surprise us to learn
that this income, arising during hi. life, may be taken for the
the payment of debts arising after the creation of the trust.'
That a trust is valid to conserve the property during the
life of A and upon his death, to convey it to his then living children, or the issue of dead ones, is unqueitionable, although during A's lifetime no one is entitled to the rents save the trustee
who may take therefrom a reasonable compensation for his
trouble 3 and the cestuis que trust are indeterminate until his
death. If A should make such a trust for the benefit of his own
surviving children, it would be valid against his subsequent
creditors. It is difficult to understand why these children should
be deprived of the trust, at the instance of A's creditors, because
he in the trust, reserved to himself an interest for the period of
his lifetime. Yet, that such reservation makes the trust voidable
by his creditors, not only as against the interest, but as against
the ulterior interest of the remaindermen, is the implication of
the cases already cited." It would have been quite easy to hold
that the interest of the grantor should be voidable by his creditors,
without holding that the interest of others should be smitten with
voidableness at the same time. A could have given them all, without successful objection by creditors, but because he chose to give
them only some, reserving the rest for himself, they may be made
to lose even what he gave them. The wisdom of those who made
this determination, like the ways of the Almighty, is indeed past
finding out.
Whether a person will be allowed to settle any portion less
than all, of his property for his own benefit so as to be free
from liability for creditors, is a pertinent question. Occasionally
phrases are employed which insinuate that less than all one's
property may be so settled. Clark, J., remarks" "it has never
been held by this court, that a person suijuris could settle his
entire estate upon himself free from liability for debts." But at
times the suggestion is made that the reason for refusing immunity from appropriation by creditors is a supposed incongruity
between a man's having property and, being suijuris, exonerat'2Ghormly v,Smith, 139 Pa. 584; Hermans v. Hill, 2 Kulp i4.

"3Ashhurst v. Given, 5W. & S. 323; Brown v. Williamson, 36 Pa. 338.
"Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330; Patrick v. Bingaman, i2 Super. 223.
"5Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa. 584.
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ing it from liability; thus retaining "the temporal ownership
"It would" says Thompson, J., in asenwithout its incidents."
tence which draws a frightful picture, of the mischief that
would follow, "It would revolutionize the credit system entirely,
destroy all faith in the apparent ownership of property, and reThis inpeal all our statutes and decisions against frauds."'"
congruity would exist, when A caused the immunity to attach
to one-tenth of his estate, as truly as it would were that immunity
attached to one-fifth or one-half or all.'"
An unmarried woman, can no more protect her property
from appropriation by future creditors, by means of a trust for
her own benefit, than can a man, 8 although another could create
a spendthrift's trust for her.'9
The attempt is made to justify the doctrine that a man cannot settle property by a trust, for his own benefit, so as to
exempt it from attachment or levy, by saying that the prohi-bition of conveyances with intent to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors would be of little use if the debtor may put his estate
beyond the reach of creditors, and still get a living from it." A
woman contemplating marriage, may settle her estate to her sole
and separate use, although one of the results, and an intended
result, is the exemption of the property from a sale in payment
of mortgages, or other debts that she may subsequently create.
It has not been supposed that such a settlement was ifsofaclo
fraudulent as to future creditors.'
But, in Harlan v. Maglaughlin," it was held that a voluntary conveyance by a husband to a wife, when he was not indebted nor contemplating the creation of debts was not voidable
by those to whom he subsequently became indebted. Yet he
must have intended thus to put the property beyond the reach
IGMackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330.
17So assumes apparently Weand J. in Barber v. Snyder, 17 Mont. 195.
"Patrick v. Bingaman 2 Super 113; Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa. 584;
Barber v. Snyder, 17 Mont. 195.
"Ashhurst's Appeal, 77 Pa. 464; Cridland's Estate, 7 Phila. 58. In
Stewart v. Madden, 153 Pa. 445, the court refrained from deciding whether
a feme-covert could settle property for her own benefit, so as to exempt it
from her debts thereafter created.
2
'Patrick v. Bingaman, 2 Super, 113, citing McAllister v. Marshal, 6
Binn. 338; Johnson v. Harvey, 2 P. & W. 82.
'Lancaster v. Dolan, i R. 231.
219o Pa. 293.
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of debts that he might thereafter create, since that was the inevitable result. If A can thus effectively give his property to
B, at a time when he is not indebted, although he subsequently
becomes indebted, this act is not necessarily done for the purpose
of delaying, hindering, or defrauding creditors, and if A can convey for the benefit of B, without such intention, why can he not
without such intention convey for his own benefit? How can it
matter for whose benefit the property is gratuitously conveyed,
so far as future creditors are concerned ? If a man can give his
land to B, without fraud, so that his creditors cannot touch it,
why can he not give it to himself, with a similar result? Whatever the reason, it clearly is not the presence in the latter case
of a fraud which is wanting in the former.
Let us suppose that A settles his estate on X, in trust for
himself, so as not to be liable for his future debts. A year after,
he applies to Y for a loan of $1000. Y is aware that X has thus
parted with his property, without reserving power of revocation.
How can.V say that the previous conveyance is a fraud on him ?
The question of Strong, J., in a case in which A conveyed land
to X for the benefit of himself A, and his wife, for life, and for
their children in remainder, and in which, B, after the conveyance, and with knowledge of it, became a creditor, is pertinent
here; "And if he (B) knows of the conveyance when he extended
credit to Snyder, how can he be said to have been defrauded by
it? If he had been a purchaser of the land from Snyder (A)
with knowdedge of the previous voluntary conveyance, it cannot
be doubted that it would have been good against him. His situation was no better as a creditor, if he had knowledge of the conIt is not clear then that one who gives credit to A,
veyance." '
knowing that he had already made his property unattachable or
unleviable, is not defrauded by such settlement? If he is defrauded at all, it is by his own act. As says Smith, J.,1 in an
early case "Creditors cannot complain because they are bound to
know the foundation upon which they extend their credit." The
true ground for holding such settlement void for fraud is, that the
creditor has not known of it before giving the credit; a ground,
however, to which none of the cases make any reference. If B
already knows that A has till recently owned land, he may assume, when A, applies for a loan, that A is still the owner. It
22Snyder v. Christ, 39 Pa. 499. Approved in Harlan v. Maglaughlin.
2"Fisher'v. Taylor, 2 R. 33.
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could be proper to hold the voluntary trust void as to B, but no
semblance of plausibility adheres to the proposition that B is defrauded if when he lends, he knows of the trust.
There is one case which maintains that A can validly settle
his property on B for the purpose of paying a special debt which
is sure to arise in the future. A transferred to B $47.67 in order
that B might keep it until A's death, and then use it in meeting
the expenses of her burial. A having become insane and become
a charge on the poor district, the court refused at its instance, to
compel B to pay the money over to it.
The court found that
there was "good reason for the trust."4 One does not easily see
how it is more necessary for a man to be buried when he dies,
than for him to be preserved from starvation while alive, and'a
trust to accomplish the latter object appears just as meritorious
as one to affect the former. If it harrows the feelings of civilized
men to see corpses unburied, it ought no less so, to see men who
have heretofore lived in comfort, brought down to death by want
of food, shelter and clothing, and one would readily suppose that
society would look with favor on the withdrawal by a man of a
reasonable quantity of property from the vicissitudes of business
for the purpose of securing for him a modest support in old age,
or after the vigor of his mind and body had been sapped from
whatever cause. The courts, however, that have taken society
into their guardianship, have vetoed such arrangements.
A may have a worthless, vicious, dissipated son, who may
live for seventy-five years. It is to the interest of society that
this loafer should not propagate his kind, and should be snuffed
out as soon as in the natural course of things, such creatures
would be snuffed out. But the courts allow his father or mother,
his grand-father or grandmother, his brother or sister, nay
probably any friend that takes the whim to preserve his accursed
existence to compel the toilers of the human species to feed him
and his wretched progeny, to clothe and house them. If they
choose they may even provide for him a life of luxury and extravagance, at the expense of the human workers that already
have so dreadful a burden cast on them.
2

Foley's Estate, 12 Luz. Leg. Reg. 227. Cf. Wanner v. Snyder, 177 Pa.
208, where it is held that, though generally a spendthrift trust is not good,
if the trustee and cestuique trust are the same person, yet, if the spendthrift is required to use some of the proceeds of the estate for the benefit
of another person, the trust will be valid.
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All this can be done with the approval of the judges; but if
a man, become conscious of his weakness, or vice, wishing to
withdraw from his credit-assets any portion of his property, so
as to secure his own future, settles it in trust, any body who
chooses to lend him money, even for the satisfaction of hisvices,
or for use in improvident and ignorant speculation, may destroy
the provision he has made for himself, by attaching it or levying
upon it in execution.
For the principle that nobody, who is not mentally or physically disabled, by youth, age, vice or disease, shall be exempt
from the need of industry, self-denial, prudence, for the con-

servation of the property which yields him support, much could
be said. Nothing can be said for the denial to a man of the
power to do for himself with property already his, what any
body else, if so minded, can do for him.

If A can make a spend-

thrift trust for X, it is absurd to decide that A cannot make a
spendthrift trust for himself.

It is absurd to say that in the

former case creditors advised of the limitations upon A's rights
in the property, have themselves only to blame, if they give him

credit in hope of attaching that property, and, in the latter that
they have a right despite these limitations to seize it; in short,
consciously to annul by the act of giving credit to the spend-

thrift, the limitations which he has sought to impose on his
own prodigality and folly.21
25The ordinary way in which creditors attack trusts for the benefit of
the settler is attachment of the income or, when it is money, of the corpus,
in the hands of the trustee, who is made garnishee. In Hermans v. Hill,
z Kulp, 14, a lessee of land embraced in the trust was made garnishee with
respect to the rent which it had not paid.
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MOOT COURT.
WILLIArl HInES vs. JACOB HOLLOHAN.
Sale-When Title passes.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Himes offered a horse to Hollohan for $175, to be delivered the next
day, on Hollohan's paying $75 in cash and delivering a note with surety
for $100. Hollohan agreed to these terms. The next day, Himes tendered
the horse, and asked for the money and note. Hollohan declined to accept the horse or give the money or note. The horse would have sold for
$150 in the market. Himes instantly sued for $175, the price.
Chase for the Plaintiff.
The sale was complete and the title had passed to the vendee. 59
Pa. 281. The measure of damages is the full contract price, 46 Pa. 179.
Faller for the Defendant.
The sale was conditional. Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, Vol. 6 p. 455.
Measure of damages difference between contract price and market value.
Girard v. Taggart; 5 S. & R. 19; Guillon V. Earnshaw, 169 Pa. 463.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
GRAYBILL, J.-Nothing was required at common law togive validity
to a sale of personal property except the mutual assent of the parties.
Ordinarily, whenever a controversy arises as to the true character of the
agreement, as to whether title has passed or not, the question is rather
one of intention than of strict law, to be collected from the language
used, the subject-matter, and the attendant circumstances. Winslow vs.
Leonard, 24 Pa. 14; Hatch vs. Standard Oil Co., 100 U. S. 124. The
question of intention is usually for the jury, but we will regard this as a
given contract. We think title passed in this case, but in so deciding we
have deference for excellent arguments which might be made that it did
not pass and for any opinion contrariwise that the appellate court may
have.
An express agreement that title shall pass before payment and delivery is not necessary in order to pass title, but such understanding may
be implied from the circumstances. Bonn vs. Haire, 40 Mich. 404. Where
there is no manifestation of intention as to the passing of title, except
what arises from the terms of the sale, the presumption is, if the thing
to be sold is specified and it is ready for immediate delivery, that the
contract is an actual sale; if the terms of the bargain and sale, including
the price, are explicit and mutually assented to, there is no reason for
imputing to the parties any intention to suspend the transfer of the property. 1 Benjamin on Sales 324; 24 A. & E. Enc. of Law 1051; Hatch vs.
Oil Co., supra. Title may pass without payment of the price or delivery
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of possession. Tiffany on Sales 27; Bowen vs. Burk, 13 Pa. 146, saying,
"If a man sell his horse for money, though he may keep him until he is
paid, yet the property of the horse is in the buyer;" Shaw vs. Levy, 17 S.
& R. 99; Arkansas Cattle Co. vs. Mann, 130 U. S. 69; Olyphant vs. Baker,
5 Denio 379. Gibson, C. J., quoting approvingly from 2 Blackstone's
Comm. 447 in Hazard vs. Hamlin, 5 Watts 201, says: "But where nothing
is paid or delivered it is agreed on all hands,that the contract is merely
Sharswood in a note to Blackstone's Comm. referring to
executory."
the same quotation says: "The authorities cited (by Blackstone) do not
support this sentence. . . . At common law, when the terms of sale
are agreed on and the bargain is struck, and everything that the seller
has to do with the goods is complete, the contract of sale becomes absolute as between the parties without actual payment or delivery, and the
property and the risk of accident to the goods vest in the buyer. 2 Kent's
Comm. 492."
Applying these principles to this case, we think it was an executed
sale. It may have been to the advantage of each of the parties to defer
delivery and payment until the next day, particularly to permit the buyer
to secure a surety for his note. The seller had nothing further to do to
put the chattel into deliveralle shape. Though he offered the horse "to
be delivered the next day," yet how or where does not appear, and in the
absence of such stipulations nothing more was incumbent upon the seller,
but it was the buyer's duty to receive the horse and pay the money at
the seller's residence. We think the words "to be delivered" merely
meant the transfer of the manual possession and receiving payment,
which, under the facts of the case, we must assume were to take place
at the seller's residence. The chattel was designated, ready for delivery,
the terms were specifically agreed upon, and there is nothing in the circumstances or subject-matter to show any intention or reason why the
title did not pass when Hollohan accepted Himes' offer. The presumption
is that title did pass then.
Title having passed, the vendor could recover the entire price. It
has been held in numerous cases that where there is to be an extension
of credit by the buyer giving his note, which he refuses to do when the
goods are tendered, or after they are delivered, the right of action accrues at once before the expiration of the term of credit. Hanna vs.
Mills, 21 Wend. 90; Jacquinth vs. Adams, 60 Vt. 392; Girard vs. Taggart,
5 S. & R. 19. The vendor may recover the price of goods where they
have only been bargainedand sold to him. 2 Benj. on Sales 983; 24 A. &
E. Enc. of Law 1120; Reynolds vs. Callendar, 19 Pa. Super. 610; Doremus
vs. Howard, 23 N. J. L. 390.
In Rinehart vs. Olwine, 5 W. & S. 157, some of the goods had been
delivered and the buyer failed to give his note according to the contract,
and the vendor recovered the entire price before the expiration of the
term of credit. When title has passed, he should recover upon the same
principle in this case though there has been no delivery. 24A. & E. Enc.
of Law 1123.
In a very extensive search, we have found no other case so nearly
analogous to the case at bar andin which the law controlling this case is
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so clearly and admirably stated as Schnebley vs, Shirteliff, 7 Phila. 236.
There the price of specific furniture was agreed upon, but no delivery
made, and when delivery was tendered, acceptance and payment were
refused. Hare, P. J., made the rule absolute for a new trial because
erroneous instructions had been given to the jury under the counts in the
declaration, but he says distinctly, (notwithstanding the misleading syllabus of the reporter), that the contract price could have been recovered
upon proper counts in the declaration. We think title had passed in this
case and that the plaintiff can recover the contract price.
Judgment for the plaintiff for $175.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
We do not think that the ownership of the horse passed to Hollohan.
It is true that he accepted the offer to sell it for $175 with the condition
that he pay $75 in cash and give a note for $100, on the following day, and
thiis made a contract to buy the horse on those terms. But it was the
evident intention of the parties that the payment of $75 and the delivery
of the note were to be simultaneous with the delivery of the horse, and
with the transit of the ownership of it from Himes to Hollohan. There
is no trace of expression of an intention that this change of ownership
should precede the delivery.
If the ownership did not pass simultaneously with the making of the
contract, it does not follow that the vendor's only remedy is an action for
the damages suffered by the refusal of the vendee to accept the horse;
for the difference, that is, between the price which Hollohan agreed to
pay, viz $175, and the actual value of the horse, which was $150. The
contradictoriness and vagueness of the decisions upon this point, are well
exhibited in 24 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law. But no good reason can be
urged for m'aintaining that the vendor may not tender the chattel to the
vendee, and if the latter declines to receive it, treat himself as a mere
bailee of it for the benefit of the vendee, hold it ready for delivery at any
time, and sue at any time for the price.
In Ballentine v. Robinson, 46 Pa. 177, Strong J. states that "where
the subject of the sale is a specific article, where the contract has been
so far completed as to pass the property in the article to the vendee, the
possession being retained only because the price is not paid, there seems
no good reason why the vendor should not be permitted to recover the
agreed value. He has fully complied with all that he was under obligation to do. He has parted with his property [he has not parted with the
possession] and given the full equivalent for the stipulated price." But,
how can it be important, whether the abstract ownership has passed or
not, if it will pass, simultaneously with the enforcement by the vender of
the payment of the contract price?
Hollohan has contracted to pay $175 to Himes, on Himes' doing a certhing, viz, tendering the horse on the following day. Himes performs the
condition. Why then is not Hollohan to perform his promise? Why must
Himes be content with some other performance than that for which he
stipulated? Why must he be content to keep the horse, -a thing he did
not agree to do, and to take $25 from 'Iollohan, instead of the $175? If
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the condition in which Hollohan had contracted to pay $175 had been
something othei than the delivery of a chattel, with its ownership, there
is no doubt that on the performance of the condition, Himes could have
recovered the $175. Why arbitrarily take out of the general class of contracts, this particular subclass of contracts for the sales of chattels, and
refuse to apply to it the principles that are applied to the class?
It may be suggested that the remedies of the vendee and those of the
vendor should be reciprocal; that, if the vendor can compel payment of
the price; and ipso facto, specific performance by the vendee, the vendee
should be able to corjpel specific performance by the vendor. That possibly is true, and it is further true that, unless the chattel has some
peculiar properties, or there are" circumstances making in the opinion of
judges, damages an insufficient remedy, the vendee cannot compel the
vendor specifically to perform, -and must be content with damages. But
there is no very good reason for the rule which denies to the purchaser
the right to a specific performance, even in the ordinary case, and it is
not necessary to make the adoption of a correct rule as to the vendor's
rights, wait for the adoption of a correct rule with respect to the yendee's rights. The same case cannot call for the promulgation of both
sets of rules, and it is no good reason for not dealing sanely with the
vendor, that courts have heretofore dealt insanely with the vendee.
When A contracts to build a machine, wagon, piano, etc., for B, for
a certain price, A is not confined, when, tendering the completed article,
B declines to receive it, to an action for damages. He may recover the
contract price. Ballentine v. Robinson, 46 Pa. 177. Itis true that Strong
J. in attempting to supply argument to sustain this result suggests that
"the right of property was clearly in them [the vendees] on notice of
the completion of the article," and he adds the fantastic observation that
"the materials of which it [the engine] was composed may fairly be said
to have been delivered [to the vendee] when they were put into the engine"! ! Why rest a common sense decision to allow the maker of the
engine, under contract, to compel the person who ordered it to pay for
it, on the preposterous conception that each particular piece of this engine
was delivered or on the no less preposterous conception that the ownership of the machine passed with the notice of its completion to the vendee, when it was adjusted to another piece of it? The words of Rice, P.
J., in Keeler v. Schott, 1 Super, 458, in explanation of the statement of
Strong, J., fail to mitigate the absurdity of his suggestion. Keeler v.
Schott does not commit the court to the position that the manufacturer of
an article may not recover the contract price, even when the title has not
passed, in cases in which the thing is not readily marketable. But why
complicate the rule by qualifying it in this unnecessary way? The purchaser has caused the machine to be made, by offering a certain price for
it. It is accordingly made. Can anyone suggest why he should not pay*
for it? Can anyone make clear why, if the article is readily marketable,
the manufacturers should have to sell it and be content with recovering
the loss, or should have to prove what the market value of such an article was, whereas, if it is not readily marketable, he should be allowed
to obtain the price agreed upon? If the vendor can sell the article to
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another, so can the vendee. He may even employ the manufacturer to
sell it for him. There is no good reason for his being allowed to cast on
the vendor the trouble and the risk of a resale, or of proof of the market
value.
Several cases in this state seem to indicate, that when a contract is
to sell a specific thing, and the vendor has done all that he is required to
do, he may recover the contract price. This case is contrasted with contracts for the sale of goods "not specific," or of goods yet to be manufactured. The "manifest tendency of the American courts, said Clark,
J., "is to the doctrine that when the vendor stands in the position of a
complete performance on his part, he is entitled to recover the contract
price as his measure of damages. In the case of an executory contract
for the sale of goods not specific, the rule undoubtedly is that the measure of damages for a refusal to receive the goods, is the difference between the price agreed upon and the market value on the day appointed
for delivery." Unexcelled Fire Works Co. v. Polites, 130 Pa. 536, This
sentence is quoted in Jones v. Jennings Bro. 168 Pa. 493; Guillon v.
Earnshaw, 169 Pa. 463; and in Reynolds v. Callender, 19 Super. 610. In
the Ihst case it was held that A having contracted to sell certain specific
shares of stock in a corporation and having tendered them, could, the
vendee refusing to accept, recover the contract price. "The rule of law
above quoted" says W. W. Porter, J., referring to the rule that the
damages are the difference between the contract price and the market
value of the goods, "in respect to the measure of damages, has therefore
no application, since it applies only in cases of sale of "goods not specific. "
The sale in the case before us, is the sale of a specific horse. It was
duly tendered by the vendor. Although the authorities are bewilderingly
confused, we adopt the principle that when the vendor, in such a case,
properly tenders the chattel and it is refused, the vendor may sue for
and recover the price. By such act of course, the ownership which has
not yet passed from him, goes over to the vendee. The successful action
is an election to regard the chattel as the vendee's
The concession of this right to recover the whole purchase money is
not inconsistent with the alternative right of obtaining the difference between the actual market valhe of the article, and the larger contract
price. The vendor may not unreasonably have the option, either to treat
the thing as become or becoming the property of the buyer, or acquiescing
in his repudiation of it, to sue for damages.
Judgment affirmed.

WM. SOAMES vs. THOS. TURPIN.
Insanity of a Grantor Makes His Deed Voidable, Not Void.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Alfred Ridge, when so insane as not to understand the effect of the
transaction, conveyed his farm, worth $10,000 to John Selden for ten
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thousand five hundred ($10,500) dollars. The money was secured by
bonds payable in 2, 3, 4, and 5 years and by a mortgage upon the premises.
Six months afterwards Selden sold the land to Soames for twelve thousand
dollars ($12,000). Soames was to pay fifteen hundred ($1500) dollars in
two months. In addition he was to pay the bonds and the mortgage
given by Selden to Ridge. Soames has paid the $1,500 and $3000 of the
bonds due to Ridge, who continues as insane as when he made the conveyance to Selden. In some way, without right, Turpin obtained possession of the land. Ejectment.
Spencer for the Plaintiff.
The deed of one who has not been judicially declared insane is not
void but voidable. Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, vol. ix, p. 119. II Kent
Comm. 451.
Wilson for the Defendant.
A deed made by an insane person is void. Rogers v. Walker, 6 Pa.
371; Matter of Desilver 5 Rawle 110.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
JONES J.-The controlling question before the court is whether the
deed of a person so insane as not to understand the effect of the transaction is void or voidable. In Pennsylvania, according, to the present
state of authorities we believe the deed of an insane person is void. In
Matter of Estate of Sarah Desilver 5 Rawle 110 decided in 1835, Gibson,
J., laid down the rule that a bargain and sale deed of an insane grantor
didn't pass the seisin to his grantee; and that at common law feoffment
and livery of seisin was voidable but his deed was void. That the bargain
and sale deed has not been given by the statute the effect of passing the
seisin to the grantee, and the purpose of the statute was "to give without the aid of feudal ceremonies the legal seisin for lawful purposes."
Dexter vs. Hall, 15 Wallace 9; Snowden vs. Dunlavey, 11 Pa. 522.
In Crawford vs. Scovell, 94 Pa. 48, Trunkey, J., says: "'Like the
deed of an infant a lunatic's deed may be ratified and confirmed. Where
there is no evidence of ratification after restoration to reason it is impossible on legal principles that the estate passed to the grantee in the
deed. An insane person is incapable of making a valid deed for he wants
the consenting mind." Then he continues in apparent contradiction. "It
holds the adult to the bargain which the infant may avoid; the sane to the
obligation from which the insane may be loosed." Can a void deed be
ratified? In Cook vs. Parker, 4 Phila. 265, Hare, J., recognized the error
of the rule. In Miller vs. Withers the Court said, "It was alleged that
the grantor of the deed was insane at the execution of the deed and that
therefore it was a nullity * * * As touching the law the Court so
held, but as touching the fact the jury did not so find." (In this case the
jury had found the grantor not insane.) In Stobert v. Smith, 189 Pa.
240 the court speaks of the deed of a person with weak mind as voidable.
In Moorhead vs. Scovell, 210 Pa. 446, the Court refused to set aside the
deed of a weak minded person though not considered a lunatic in a bill to
set aside the deed on the grounds of lunacy. But we have not been able
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to find a case in Pennsylvania reversing the rule of the Estate of Desilver
supra, or changing the rule.
Therefore, the deed between Ridge and Selden being void, Selden
took no title and had none to convey to Soames. Nor has the plaintiff
shown a prior possession which the defendant disturbed, hence, he cannot
be treated as a mere intruder upon plaintiff's right. It follows therefore
that the plaintiff must show some title better than that arising from the
defendant's possession. For possession is title and he having such title
can be ousted only by him who shows one superior to it. Fisher vs. Phila.,
75 Pa., 392; Shumway vs. Phillip, 10 Harris 151.
We believe however that the deed is not absolutely void but rather
voidable.
In 1827, Wait vs. Maxwell, 5 Pick. 217, Judge Parker said, "The
deed of an insane person is not void, but only voidable. It conveyed a
seisin to the grantee, defeasible by her, her heirs or devisees when entry
should be made to avoid it." Wharton on Contracts p. 137, recognizes this
as the better rule and says, "And unless we hold that latent insanity of
which the other contracting party'had no suspicion does not avoid a deed,
there are few titles to real estate that can be regarded as secure."
He
cites as authority for this rule cases from Massachusetts, Maine, New
Jersey, Iowa, Maryland, Illinois, Indiana and Texas. See further cases
in Am. & Eng. Ency., vol. 9, p. 119.
As a general proposition we are all more or less insane. We have all
peculiarities, and when these peculiarities become too marked the individual is considered insane. His brain may be undeveloped (as an idiot)
or diseased and thus we account for his lack of understanding, but to
make a contract no fixed standard of intelligence is required. We cannot
say that any individual who may become a party to a contract, is absolutely incapable of contracting. As was said in a Pennsylvania case a
man may be insane in one or two directions but yet may be able to drive
the shrewdest bargain. So there are some who might drive a bargain
and yet not realize its effect. Every day men presumably sane are contracting not realizing the full legal effect of their bargain. These facts
are well recognized in cases of simple contracts, in which cases even in
Pennsylvania the rule is that the contract is voidable. 78 Pa. 407; 10
Barr 56. And there is no reason why the rule should not be the same in
case of a deed. Wharton on Contracts p. 137. Why should a sale of
realty worth $300 be deemed void, and a sale of $30,000 worth of personalty be deemed simply voidable?
Justice Gibson in the Estate of Desilver, supra, rests the distinction
entirely upon the fiction of seisfn which he says didn't pass by the delivery of the deed, but would he said pass by feoffment and consequent
livery of seisin. It is hard to see how a person incapable of expressing
his intention to pass the title and possession by a delivery of a solemn
instrument the symbol of title, a deed, can be capable of expressing
such intention by the delivery of a twig, or dirt, or a pair of old shoes.
He says the purpose of the statute "was to give without the aid of
feudal ceremonies the legal seisin for lawful purposes."
Why are the
purposes for the transfer of the seisin not lawful? If it did pass the title
and right to possession, then the lunatic may avoid it, or affirm and ratify
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it as was said in Crawford vs. Scovell, supra. And is thus protected as
fully as though it were void. The fiction of seisin may be met by permitting the seisin to pass into the vendee at delivery of deed since according to reason and justice and for his lawful purposes he deserves it and
subject, at the will of the lunatic vendor or of his commission ad litem appointed or others competent by law to avoid the deed or contract, to recall. For as is plainly seen in this case if no title and right to the possession passed by the conveyance, then the rights of a purchaser would be
unjustly and therefore as we consider unlawfully withheld simply for
the protection of a wrong-doer and trespasser. For the decision of this
case it would not be necessary to decide whether the deed would be void
or voidable in case of fraud or lack of consideration. Since no fraud
or lack of consideration appears in this case; it is the burden of the
party alleging fraud to prove it and on the face of the transaction there
is neither. Ridge was given $10,500 for his property which was worth
only $10,000. And though there was no deposit, he was given the best
security, viz: bonds and mortgage. Whether or not he was getting interest doesn't appear. Even though he were not getting interest and a
shrewd business man would be careful to claim interest, yet this would
not be sufficient to raise a presumption of fraud for we are not all shrewd
business men. However in any case fraud makes a contract voidable only. Furthermore Soames was an innocent purchaser as clearly
appears by reading the facts and therefore not a party to a fraud.
Therefore Soames having the title and right to possession may recover
in ejectment. 11 Pa. C. C. 582; 1 W. & S.184.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
This is an action of ejectment by the grantee of the grantee of Alfred
Ridge, against one who has entered into possession of the premises without right. The learned court below has properly held that the plaintiff
can recover, only by showing a better title. He might have shown that
being in possession, he was without right ousted by the defendant. This
anterior possession would have entitled him to a continuance of it, as
against one having no right other than that flowing from the usurped
possession. The plaintiff however, has not proven any anterior possession.
Ridge having been the owner, his deed to Selden prima facie passed
to the latter, that ownership. Selden's conveyance to Soames has vested
him with a similar right. In virtue of this right, Soames should be able
to recover from Turpin, unless the conveyance from Ridge, or from Selden was a nullity, that is, legally no conveyance.
It is proved that Ridge was when he conveyed to Selden so insane as
not to understand the effect of the transaction. It is also proved that he
has ever since continued as insane, as he then was. The deed therefore
has obtained no confirmation, no validation, by anything done or omitted
by Ridge, since its execution. Did then the estate of Ridge pass by it to
Selden?
The opinion of a majority of the courts is, that the deed of an insane
person provisionally passes his estate. It is not void, but it may be
avoided. "But" says Am. & Eng. Encyc. p. 119, "the deed of one who
has not been judicially declared insane is not wholly void; it conveys the
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seisin, and must therefore be avoided at the grantor's instance, after
restoration to reason, or at the instance of his heirs or legal representatives after his death, or his privies in estate, or legal guardian at any
time until by lapse of time or legal affirmance, the right to avoid is lost."
Says 22 Cyc. p. 1171 "The weight of authority is in favor of the rule that
the deeds of persons in fact insane, but not so adjudicated, in whatever
form such deeds are made, are merely voidable and not absolutely void,
although there are cases to the contrary." Both of these authorities
mention Pennsylvania among the states whose courts hold the deed of a
lunatic not voidable merely but void.
It has however, never been decided in this state, that a lunatic's deed
is void. In In re Desilver's Estate, 5 R. 111, the proceeding was to escheat the land of Sarah Desilver" To defeat the escheat, it was shown
that she had conveyed the land to Thomas J. Kitts. Gibson C., J., held
that the state, as ultima haeres, had the same right to avoid the deed
that Sarah Desilver's heirs or nextof kin would have had. The observations
of the Chief Justice; that "at common law the feoffment of a madman, as
shown by the argument, is only voidable, but his deed is absolutely void"
was entirely irrelevant, to say nothing of the absurdity, on which the
learned court below comments, of making a distinction between the
feoffment and the grant of an insane person. The heir of the insane person could avoid the deed even if it was merely voidable. So could the
commonwealth, as ultima haeres. The same Chief Justice, in Rogers v.
Walker, 6 Pa. 371, says, referring to an insane person's deed, "No right
can spring from a void and prohibited contract," but that case was ejectment by the lunatic grantor herself by her committee, against the grantee
of her grantee. All that it was necessary to decide then, was, that the
lunatic could, on proving insanity avoid the deed, despite the maxim
against a man's stultifying himself, a maxim which had been discredited
in Bensell v. Chancellor, 5 Wh. 371. In Snowden v. Dunlavey, 11 Pa.
522, Chief Justice Gibson again makes the inane distinction between
feoffment and deed, and says that an insane man's deed is void. But the
proceeding was a partition in the common pleas, which was held practicable, although one of the defendants had been declared a lunatic, and a
committee represented her in the action. Chess v. Chess, 1 P. &. W. 32,
was a defence by the heirs of the grantor against an ejectment by the
grantee. Even the dicta in the case are far from distinctly saying that
an insane man.s deed is incapable of confirmation. Cook v. Parker, 4
Phila. 265, was an attempt by the mortgagor to avoid his mortgage, on
the scire facias sur mortgage. The distinction between a void and voidable deed was irrelevant.
In Crawford v. Scovell, 94 Pa. 48, the ejectment was brought by the
grantor against his grantee, who set up, in defence the conveyance.
The grantor, it was held could annul it, by proving his insanity. "Like
the deed of an infant" says Trunkey, J., "a lunatic's deed may be ratified
and confirmed."
He proceeds to say that "an insane person is incapable
of making a valid deed, for he wants the consenting mind." The case
did not require a distinction between voidness and voidableness, and we
cannot suppose the justice to have meant to make it.

THE FORUM

283

We have nothing but dicta, therefore, in this state, for the doctrine
that a lunatic's deed is absolutely void, and the decisions heretofore made,
present no obstacle to our holding as do the courts of so many states,
that the estate of a lunatic grantor-when no committee has been appointed to take charge of his property-passes by his deed to his grantee,
and abides with the grantee or his grantee, etc., until steps are taken
by the grantor, his committee, or his heir, to annul it, either by bill in
equity, by action of ejectment, or otherwise.
The lucid opinion of the learned court of common pleas fully justifies
the judgment rendered by it.
Judgment affirmed.

YOUNG vs. THE CUrIBERLAND VALLEY k. CO.
Survival of Action for Damages for Death Caused By NegligenceWhen Action [lust be Brought.-Measure of Damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On July 1, 1905, Joseph Young was injured as a result of the negligence of the defendant Company. He was so seriously injured that he
was expected to die at any time but by dint of very careful nursing he
was kept alive until August 3, 1907, when he died as a result of his injuries aforesaid. His widow Mary Young, began this action for damages,
in pursuance of the Act of April 20, 1855.
Funk for the Plaintiff.
The action can be brought within one year after death of injured
party.
Jones, A. H. for Defendant.
The Act of 1855 must be construed strictly. Moe v. Smiley, 125 Pa.
136.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MULHEARN, J.-The Act of April 20, 1855, which gives the husband
or wife, child or parents, an action for damages for injuries which result
in death, is in derogation of the common law. The Act of June 24, 1895,
P. L. 236 provides as follows: "Every suit hereafter brought to recover
damages for injury wrongfully done to the person in case injury does not
result in death must be brought within two (2) years from the time the
injury was done and not afterwards. In cases where the injury does result in death, the limitation of action shall remain as now established by
law."
In the case at bar the injuries did result in death, consequently
we are compelled to inquire into the law as it existed prior to 1895. An
early statute provides that actions for damages on account of injuries
shall be brought within two (2) years after the injury occurs. There has
been considerable modern legislation relating to the limitation of actions,
but we do not think that either of the late Acts, namely, Acts of 1855
and 1895, apply to this particular case. The Act of April 26, 1855, requires that the action be brought within one (1) year after death of the
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person injured. There are many cases which hold that the Act conflicts
with the common law principle and must therefore be construed strictly.
In Margaret Hughes vs. The Delaware and Hudson Canal Company,
176 Pennsylvania 254, Chief Justice Mitchell says: "If the defendant
would not have been liable to him in the first instance it was not made
liable to her by his death. We are not aware of any case in which a
widow has recovered for injuries to her husband where he could not have
done so himself, if he had not survived."
In the case at bar the husband could have maintained an action at
any time within two (2) years after he suffered the injury, but upon the
expiration of the two (2) years, his action was barred by virtue of the
Act of 1713. From this it would follow, adopting the reasoning of Chief
Justice Mitchell in Hughes vs. The Delaware and Hudson Canal Company
in 176 Pennsylvania 254, supra no action survived to the widow.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The injury to Joseph Young occurred July 1st, 1905. He died from
it August 3d, 1907. The widow brought this action shortly afterwards.
The question is, whether it was brought too late.
When Joseph Young received the injury, he had an immediate right
of action. But, if he failed to sue before dying, his right of action perished. Miller v. Umbehower, 10 S. &. R. 31. His administrator could
not sue. So, had he brought suit and died pending the action, it would
have abated, with his death, prior to the Act of April 15th, 1851. That
Act allows the substitution of the administration or executor as plaintiff,
and the prosecution of the suit to "final judgment and satisfaction." No
action was brought by Young in his lifetime. The right which he had
died with him.
The Act of April 15th, 1851, in such a case (that is, when a husband died
in consequence of a negligent injury, not having commenced an action for
it) created a right of action. This action however, unlike that which the
husband might have brought, was not for the injury to him, but for death,
resulting from that injury. For the death there never was a right of action
in him. His death indeed extinguished the right to sue even for the ante
mortem injury. The Act of 1851 enacts that "whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no suit for damages be
brought by the person injured during his or her life, the widow of any such
deceased * * * may maintain an action for and recover damages for,
the death thus occasioned."
The action is for, the damages recoverable,
are for, the "death thus occasioned."
The injured man would have recovered for his pain and suffering, his physicians' expenses, the effect on
his earning power for the future of his disablement. The widow, suing
in virtue of the act recovers for none of these things. She sues for the
loss to her, from the disappearance of her husband. Since then, he could
not have sued at all, for his death, and she can sue only for his death;
since he, if suing, could have recovered only compensation for ante-mortem
hurt, pain, expenses and reduction of earning power, while she can recover only for the effects upon her of his demise, it is impossible to concede the accuracy of the assertion found in Hughes vs. D. & H. Canal Co.
176 Pa. 254 that "the foundation of her claim was the injury to him, for
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which he might have sued in his lifetime," or the other assertion "the
original right of action is in him, and hers is but in succession or substitution for his, where he has not asserted it himself," If he had sued the
sum recovered would have been his; or he dying, before judgment, his
administrator's. Creditors could have appropriated it. What she recovers
belongs to her and the children. Her right of action rests on facts which
did not give him a right of action. Her recovery will be of a totally different sort of damages. The statute of limitations, as to his action, began to run from the injury; as to her action, it by the Act of April 26th
1855, begins to run from his death. Cf. Fink vs. Yarman, 40 Pa. 95.
The practical question before us, is, whether this action was brought
in time. It was brought less than a year after the husband's death,
which, however, occurred more than two years after the accident. The
Act of 1855 required the action to be brought within one year after the
death. The Act of June 24th, 1895 prescribes that for injuries not resulting in death, i. e. for which the person who suffers the injury must
bring the action, the action shall be begun within two years from the time
when the injury was done; but it provides that, when the injury results
in death, the limitation of action shall remain as now established, that is,
it shall be one year from the death. The action therefore is in time.
Judgment reversed.
WM. WHITE vs. LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Insurance Policy-Admissibility of the Declarations of the Insured to
affect the Beneficiary.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Amos White had procured an insurance on his life, $5,000 payable
to his father, William. He represented his age to be thirty. At the
trial William was dead and his administrator substituted. Defendantundertook to prove that Amos was thirty-six years old instead of thirty by
showing declarations of age made on various occasions by Amos, notwithstanding objection. The Court admitted the evidence.' Motion for a new
trial.
Temko for the Plaintiff.
Otto for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BIGELOW, J.-The general doctrine is that the declarations of a
party to the record, or of one identified in interest with him are as against
such party admissible in evidence against him.
As to parties who are not parties to the record, but have an interest
in the subject matter of the suit the law in regard to this source of evidence looks chiefly to the real parties in interest and gives to their admissions the same weight as though they were parties to the record.
The reason for admitting declarations made by one against his interest is explained in Galbraith vs. Green, 13 S, & R, 84, where the learned

286

THE FORUM

court said: "What a man says against his own interest may be safely
believed but it is not safe to credit him when advancing his own interest."
In the case at bar there was every good reason why Amos should
want to conceal his real age from the insurance company. In dealing
with an insurance company, good faith requires that all circumstances
which would influence an insurance company in granting a rate of insurance should be disclosed to the company. If the knowledge of a fact
would cause the insurance company to reject the risk, or to aceept it only
at a higher premium that fact is material, and good faith, the essence of
insurance rating, requires a complete disclosure of such facts. The representations of Amos were clearly made by him to influence the company
and such influence acting upon them inured to his benefit, the presumption being that he secured a lower rate of insurance than would have been
accorded him had his true age been disclosed. A long line of Pennsylvania cases are as a unit upon the admissions made by one against his
interest.
In Simons vs. Vulcan Oil Co., 61 Pa. 202. the court commits himself
to the proposition that declarations of a party against his interest are admissable against him no matter when made.
In Schall vs. Miller, 5 Wharton 155 the court in commenting upon
declarations against interest says: The admissions of a party against his
interest are evidence in favor of the other side when they bear on the
matter in issue, whether made during the time he had the interest or
preceding it.
The object of the testimony of declarations made by Amos was no
doubt to show that fraud or deceit had been practiced upon the Insurance
Company and in this point of view it was pertinent testimony.
Court below was right in admitting the testimony, and the rule for a
new trial is discharged.
Affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The policy though procured by Amos White upon his own life, was
payable to his father Wllliam. William is not an assignee or grantee of
his son. The death of Amos would not render the stockholders of the insurance company incompetent to testify under clause e of section 5 of the
act of May 23d 1887. The deceased never had any right to the benefit
which was to be paid to his father.. Hamill v. Supreme Council, 152 Pa.
537.
Had there been a relation of assignor and assignee between Amos and
William, declarations affecting his title by Amos, made while he was the
owner of the thing assigned, would have been receivable to affect his
assignee, but declaration of the assignor made before he became interested in the thing, and declarations made after he ceased to be interested, would not be received to.affect his assignee. It does not distinctly
appear when the declarations offered in the trial were made. They may
have been made before or after the taking of the policy. In either case,
they would not be receivable to affect William.
The precise question before us, has been considered by a number of
courts, and, in no case in which the assured has not retained the right
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to alter the beneficiary, has the admissibleness of his declarations,
whether before or after the issue of the policy been conceded, except
when the declarations were parts of the so-called res .qe.tae, i.e., the process of procuring the insurance.
In Sutcliffe v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Association, 119 Ia. 220,
the effort was to show that the assured committed suicide, by his own
declaration that he had shot himself purposely. Not being a part of the
res gestae, the declaration was not admitted.
Statements of the assured concerning his physical condition when the
insurance was obtained, were not received to contradict his representations to the company, in Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Selby, 72
Fed. Rep. 980.
In McGowan v. Supreme Court of Independent Order of Foresters,
80 N. W. Rep. 603, (Wise.) declarations of the assured, made a few
months before the issue of the certificate, which were inconsistent with
his averments in the application were held receivable, only after independent proof of the facts averred in these declarations, and for the purpose of showing the assured's knowledge of the facts stated therein; his
knowledge being material.
The assured having stated in his application, that he had never had
the colic, the effort of the company was to show that he had had that disease. It sought to prove this by means of an application, three years before to another company, in which he had stated that he had suffered
from the colic twice. It was held, that, though the assured had the
power to change the beneficiary, and, in a sense the interest of the original beneficiary was contingent, the declarations in the earlier applications were inadmissible. Rawson v. Milwaukee Life Insurance Company
(Wis.) 92.
In Union Central Life Insurance Company v. Cheever, 36 Oh. St. 201,
where the policy was issued to the wife of the assured, it was sought to
show that his statement in the application that he had not had certain
diseases was untrue, by producing a letter written a few months before,
in which he admitted that he had had a cancerous affection. It was not
admissible because not a part of the res gestae and because proof of his
knowledge that he had certain diseases, was irrelevant.
There are specimens. There are many others cited by Prof. Kales in
an article on The Admissibility of Declarations of Insured Against the
Beneficiary in the Columbia Law Review for 1906, p. 509. He summarises the doctrine of the cases. Declarations before the date of the
policy have never been held admissible. Declarations after that date have
never been held receivable when the beneficiary has a vested, an indivestible (by the assured) interest. When the assured has the power to
change the beneficiary, three cases have held that the declarations are,
and two that they are not receivable. But in a large number of cases, in
which no reference is made to the divestible or indivestible character of
the beneficiary's interest, the declarations have been excluded.
In Hughes v. D. & H. Canal Co., 166 Pa. 254, it was held in an
action by a widow for the negligent killing of her husband, that since her
right of action was derived from his right of action for personal injuries,
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there was such privity between her and him, that his declarations as, to the
cause of the accident, tending to show contributory negligence, were receivable. The analogy between cases of that sort, and suits upon policies of insurance by a beneficiary who is different from the assured, is
too slight to justify the use of this decision as an authority upon the
question before us.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

JOHN FRIEND vs. WM. FEIND.
Deceit.

Reliance Upon the Opinion of a Third Party to the Contract.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Friend was asked by Joseph Jackson to sell him a horse, and Jackson
asked Feind to persuade Friend to sell it, but this was not known to the
plaintiff. Feind saw the plaintiff, who told him of Jackson's wish and
asked him what in hi opinion the horse was worth. The plaintiff told
him that he would be governed by his opinion as to the price of the horse.
Feind told him he thought the horse worth, in the market, $150. It was
in fact worth $500 and Feind knew of three persons who were willing to
pay as much for it. Influenced by the'opinion of Feind, Friend sold the
horse for $200. This is trespass for deceit.
Easter for the Plaintiff.
A false affirmation made with the intent to deceive, whereby the
plaintiff received damage is the ground for an action of deceit. Pasley
vs. Ereeman, 3 T. R. 51. Smith on Torts, Vol. II, P. 425.
Jones for the Defendant.
A representation as to value is a mere expression of an opinion. Holbrook vs. Connor, 60 Me. 578; False statements of opinion-are not actionable. Nash vs. Trust Co., 157 Mass. 437; Simar v. Canaday, 53 N.Y. 306.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
GARRATT, J.-This is a case where one'has been injured by the deceit of a third person not a party to the contract; nor does it appear from
the facts that that person was interested in the outcome of the sale. One
reason for the lack of authorities in'Pennsylvania on such a case may be,
the infrequency of fraud practiced by one who is not in some way inter.
,
ested ....
The leading case of modern times for this class of cases is Pasley v.
Freeman; 3 T. R. 51. In that case one Joseph Freeman intending to deceive and defraud John and Edward Pasley did encourage and persuade
said John and Edward Pasley to sell to John Falch sixteen bags of cdchineal to the value of £2,634 16s. 1d. upon trust and credit, and did fraudulantly assert that John Falch was a person to be trusted when he well
knew that he could hot be trusted. The only difference between that
case and the one under consideration is the subject matter., But what is
contended? It is nothing less than that a man be allowed to assert that
which he knows to be false, and therebyiwork serious injury to his neigh-
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bor, and yet not be answerable for it. This is as repugnant to law as to
morality. It is such a deceit as has worked a severe injustice, and the
law in its universality will give substantial protection against it.
The plaintiff has alleged deceit. To support his case, "he must show
that the representation (1) was untrue; (2) was known by the defendant
to be untrue; (3) was calculated to induce the plaintiff to act; (4) and he
believing it, was induced to act accordingly." Cox v. Hughley, 100 Pa.
252.
(1) The statement that "Friend told him he thought the horse was
worth in the market $150" when "it was in fact worth $500," proves the
statement untrue. (2) The fact that "Feind knew of three persons who
were willing to pay so much for it "proves that the defendant knew the
statement to be untrue. (3) That the representation was calculated to
induce the plaintiff to act is shown by all the facts. (4) The statement
in evidence, "Influenced by the opinion of Feind, Friend sold the horse
for $200" satisfies the fourth requisite. The case of the plaintiff has
been sufficiently made out.
But two more questions arise. (1) Was the statement a mattter of
fact or a matter of opinion? (2) Was the plantiff negligent in relying on
this statement and inquiring elsewhere of no one? The fact that the
plaintiff said he would be governed by his opinion as to the price indicated
that he regarded Feind as having definite and positive knowledge of
market conditions as well as of the value of horses. If he had said that
the horse would be worth $150 to himself there would be no cause of complaint. But when he said the horse was worth in the market $150 when
he knew it to be in fact worth $500. there was clearly a misstatement of
fact. Even an opinion may be a matter of fact if it is not based on conjecture and guesswork. The state of a man's mind, his opinion, may be
as much a matter of fact as the state of his digestion. If the misstatement is based on an opinion that is a mere conjecture there can be no recovery, but if the opinion is based on a fact when stated not as an
opinion merely, there should be a recovery because it amounts to a misstatement of fact in its power to deceive.
It was suggested by the defendant in his able argument that as the
plaintiff asked for an opinion, he should have inquired of others the market conditions. The plaintiff had a legal right to rely on the statement
of one person as well as on the statements of many. If the plaintiff
could not be presumed to rely on the statement of one person, he could
hardly be compelled to rely on the statements of many. The opinion of
the minority judge in Pasley v. Freeman contained this dictum "It was
owing to their own gross negligence that they gave credence to the assertion of the defendant without taking pains to satisfy. themselves that
that assertion was founded in fact, and therefore the plaintiff should not
be allowed to recover." The three other judges failed to support this
view, the case being decided for the plaintiff on other points. A person
has a legal right to rely on the statements of another unless he has had
notice of that person's tendency to deceive. The law presumes all men
honest until the contrary is shown the same as innocence is presumed
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until guilt is proven. The intercourse of individuals and the business of
this commercial age will not permit of any other view.
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
An opinion is a fact. A horse is a fact; the vision of the horse is another, a distinct fact. One is objective the other subjective, but both
are facts. If X believes that it snows, the snowing is one fact; the believing another. If the horse was worth $500, that is a fact. If Feind
believed it to be worth $500, that is another fact. Objective facts are
not the only important ones. Our conduct is largely influenced by what
we believe to be the mental states of others. Do they intend to kill or
otherwise injure us? Do they, when they make a promise, intend to observe it? An inexperienced man attaches weight to the judgment of expert persons. In the case before us, Friend was influenced by the
opinion of Feind. He would not have sold his horse for $200, but for
Fiend's apparent opinion that it was worth but'$150.
Feind was under no obligation to tell Friend what his opinion was
concerning the worth of the horse. He would have been under no legal
obligation, when professing to express an opinion, truly to express it,
but for the fact that he was told by Friend that Feind would be governed by it. He had no legal right, under those circumstances, to misrepresent his opinion. In doing so, his design was to cause a loss to Friend,
in order to profit Jackson, and he had reason to know that the misrepresentation would produce this result.
So far as appears, Feind gained nothing for himself by the deception
of Friend. He obtained no interest in the horse. He was to receive no
compensation for procuring it at a low price. Nevertheless, Friend has
been defrauded by him, and he must atone for the fraud by compensating
the victim of it.
There are cases which hold that expressions of untrue opinions cannot constitute fraud. That may be true, when the person to whom the
expression is made, knows that it is but an opinion; but an inference from
a variety of former observations, in the drawing of which men may honestly err. The hearer of the declaration of such an opinion, knows that
it is fallible, and that the declarant does not undertake to warrant its accuracy. But the true expression of an untrue opinion, is one thing, and
the untrue expression of a true opinion is a very different thing.
The horse might not have been worth $500, and Feind's opinion that
it was, if he had had it, would have been untrue, but his declaration that
he had the opinion would have been true, and there would have been no
deceit, no fraud, in his conduct. When, the horse being really worth
$500, and he, thinking it worth $500, he declared that it was worth only
$150, he untruly represented a true opinion: that is, he misrepresented a
fact, he knew that he was misrepresenting it; he knew that his misrepresentation would be accepted as true, and would influence Friend to act
as, without it, he would not act, and to his detriment.
There are cases which say that the injured party must have had a
right to rely on the representation; that he must not have been imprudent in relying upon it. Friend informed Feind that he would rely on the
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opinion of the latter. As the sequel shows, this confidence was misplaced. Perhaps Friend should have known that Feind was a cheat and a
fraud, and his not knowing it may have been the result of his negligence,
or childlike unsuspiciousness. Are we to say that the negligent man, the
confiding man may be defrauded with impunity? A jurisprudence that
avowed such a principle, would be unfit for civilized men. It matters not
how simple-minded, how neglectful of his own interests, how generously
confident of his fellowman's candor, the victim of a fraud made successful by these perhaps amiable, but not servicable defects of disposition, may be, he must be protected by the law from the fraudulent abuse
by others, of these weaknesses. It is doubtless a good thing to stimulate
the self-defensive instincts, but it is also a good thing to repress the
selfishly aggressive and unjust instincts, and that is not a sound policy
which allows a wrong to go unavenged, in order to make the victim more
alert the next time, if the effect is to make the swindler more resolute
and enterprising. We must not, in order to encourage self-care, caution,
and shrewdness, encourage rascality and fraudulence.
But nothing in the case before us justifies the assertion that it was
negligent for Friend to depend on the opinion or the word of Feind. It
is not foolish for a non-expert to rely on the judgment of a more experienced and instructed person, and Feind may have been such. Nor was
it unjustifiable, so far as appears, for Friend to believe that when Feind
professed to express his opinion, he was expressing it, as it really was.
When Friend told Feind that he would be governed by the opinion of
the latter, the latter discovered his opportunity to impose on the former.
He availed himself of it. He ought to be compelled to make good to the
former, the loss he has caused.
Judgment affirmed.

MARY THOMAS vs. JOHN SELWYN.
Ejectment of Tenant From Year to Year-Necessity for Description
of Property in Leases for a Term of Years.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The plaintiff made a lease in writing for one year with right in Selwyn to hold over for each of four years succeeding the first for a rent of
$200.
Selwyn had been in possession of the premises before, and for this or
some other reason, the written lease contained no description of the premises, did not state what it was, in what borough, counfy or state, surrounded by what adjoiners, etc.
Selwyn remained in possession three years and continued in possession the fourth year, which closed April 1, 1907. On Dec. 31st, 1906. he
was notified to vacate the premises on the first of April following.
He did not do so. This action is ejectment.
Hibbs for the Plaintiff.
A lease not containing a sufficient description of the premises to ad-
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mit of identification isvoid. Am. & Eng. Encyl. Vol. IS,p. 605. Parol
evidence not admissible to supply the description. Ferguson vs. Stayer,
33 Pa. 411. Three months notice to tenant to quit is sufficient. Act of
April 14, 1863.
Olmsted for the Defendant.
A description of the premises in a lease though imperfect, is sufficiently certain if the boundaries can be ascertained with reasonable certainty and they have been taken possession of and occupied under the
lease. Pierce v. Minturn 1 Cal. 470.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
AMBROSE, J.-Giving the case in question the construction most
favorable to the defendant, his rights thereunder are equivalent to those
of lessee for a term of five (5) years.
So far as it appears from the statement of facts, the lease itself contained absolutely no means by which the tract leased could have been
identified without the introduction of parol evidence. It does not even
affirmatively appear that it alluded to the fact that the tract in question
was in the possession of the lessee when the lease was executed. "If
the subject matter be described, parol evidence is admissible to apply the
description to the land; but it cannot be admitted, first to describe the
land sold, and then to apply the description-Ferguson et al vs. Stayer,
33 Pa. 411. Under the Pennsylvania statute, there can be no distinction
in this regard between leases and conveyances in fee, for the reason that
it operates alike upon "all leases, estates of freehold or term of years"
-Act of March 21. 1772. (Statute of Frauds).
In Palsgrove vs. Potts, 10 Forum 35, a conveyance of certain land
was made by deed, but the deed itself contained no means of ascertaining the specific tract conveyed. Subsequently, however, the parties went
upon the land and marked off the specific tract. The Supreme Court, reversing the decision below, held evidence of this latter fact to be inadmissible. The Court said "The running of the line, and the intent with
which it was done, are both established by oral evidence. The land intended might have been later defined by a draft, as it was actually defined by the running of the line on the ground. But the draft itself,
As
not referring to the writing, could not be used to supplement it."
we interpret this decision, the instrument itself must contain a description of the premises conveyed, or a distinct allusion to some means
by which the land conveyed may be specifically identified. On this point,
see also Mellon vs. McEldowney, 46 Pa. 334; Agnew vs. Southern Avenue
Land Co., 204 Pa. 142; Holthouse vs. Rynd, 9 Sadler 193.
We are therefore forced to conclude that the inadequacy of the description in the lease in question, or rather the entire absence of such a
description, and the further lack of intrinsic evidence to identify the
property leased renders the lease fatally defective. But it is further
urged that the plaintiff is estopped to set up this defect by reason of his
having accepted rent from the defendant for four years past. Under
the circumstances of the case however we do not regard this argument
as sound.
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The fundamental principle which underlies the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, is that the party estopped had by his words or conduct led the
party alleging the estoppel to assume a position in reliance upon such
words or conduct which he would not afterwards have assumed, and has
thus acquired some right or advantage of which it would be unfair to deprive him. It is accordingly held that when all the parties acted with a
full knowledge of their respective rights, no estoppel arises. Bispham's
Equity, Page 433, Sec. 229.
This -appears to have been the case here. There is no evidence that
the defendant has been led to alter his position in reliance upon the fact
that the plaintiff has received rent for the period mentioned, nor that
the plaintiff received that rent with the intention of misleading the defendant as to the validity of the lease. Indeed, it would be much more
consonant with reason to assume that the rent was paid and received by
the respective parties in good faith and the mutual belief that the lease
was perfectly valid. This is in all probability the truth of the matter.
At least the principle that fraud cannot be presumed, but must be proven
by evidence sustaining its substance, is too firmly established to require
the citation of authorities.
In addition to this, the broad general principle has been laid down in
Pennsylvania that "There can be no title by estoppel, where the contract
to which the alleged estoppel is sought to be applied is within the Statute
of Frauds, and can pass no title." Washabaugh vs. Entriken 36 Pa. 513.
Miranville vs. Silverthorn, 49 Pa. 147. We therefore direct judgment
for the Plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The lease was for one year, unconditionally. It was, conditionally
for two, three, four years additional. It must be deemhed a lease for
more than three years from the making thereof, and therefore within
the operation of the statute of frauds.
The lease was in writing, but the writing was insufficient. It did
not describe the premises contemplated by the lessor and the lessee. In
order to identify these, resort to parol evidence is necessary.
But, a lease which contravenes the statute of frauds is not void.
The lessee entering into possession, in virtue of it, and paying the rent
for a year, stipulated in it, constitutes himself a tenant from year to
year. Trickedt, Landlord and Tenant, 34, 302.
A tenant from year to year, having entered on a year, has a right to
remain in possession until its close. If he is not notified at least three
months before its close, that at its close he must vacate the premises,
he has a right to remain in possession for another full year.
The term began on April 1st, 1904. The first year ended April 1st,
1905. No notice to quit was given, the tenant remained in possession until April 1st, 1906. No notice to quit having been given three months
before April 1st, 1906, the tenant holding over had a right to continue in
possession until April 1st 1907. On December 31st, 1906, he was notified
to leave on April 1st, 1907. This notice was early enough, and it determined the right of tle defendant to occupy the house. As he did not go
out, this ejectment is the proper means to compel him.
Judgment Affirmed.
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SArlUEL SALTER vs. ERIC ERICSON.

Conditions in the Sale of Land. Enforcement of Building Restrictions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Aked owning a large piece of land, conveyed a portion one
thousand feet wide, to Jared Tombs, the deed stipulating that none but
brick houses, three stories in height and not nearer than ten feet to the
building line should be erected on it. Tombs sold the land to X, and X to
Y. Y subdivided it into four lots of twenty-five feet width each. One
of these was bought by Eric Erickson and the other three by Samuel
Salter. Erickson is building a two story frame house on his lot, the front
of which is only four feet behind the building line. This is a bill to restrain him.
Gardner for the Plaintiff.
The condition and restriction is a duty to the owner of the adjoining
lot and is enforceable by injunction in equity for his benefit. Clark vs.
Martin, 49 Pa. 289; Appeal of St. Andrew's Church, 67 Pa. 512.
Atkins for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
PIERCE, J.-The purpose of the condition in question is obvious; it
was not intended to confer a merely personal advantage upon the original
grantor, but to increase the marketability of the property affected thereby, by insurink prospective purchasers against the erection on contiguous
lots of buildings so constructed as to interfere with the full enjoyment of
their property in its original condition. As was said in Clark vs. Martin,
49 Pa. 289, "Common sense cannot doubt its purpose, and thus it becomes
plain that the duty created by the condition and restriction is a duty to
the owner of the adjoining lot, whoever he may be." That being true, it
is of course enforceable by injunction in equity for his benefit.-id. To
the same effect is Appeal of St. Andrew's Church, 67 Pa. 512.
In Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. 643, a condition in a deed very
similar to the one in question was held to be enforceable, not only by the
parties to the original deed, but by their immediate privies, in whom
title to the land affected thereby had become vested by various intermediate conveyances. This notwithstanding the fact that the original deed
expressly stated that the covenant in question was made between the
parties hereto with no indication of an intent that it should run with.the
land. "The Court said: "In principle the case does not essentially differ
from Clark v. Martin -and
St. Andrew's Church Appeal, (cited
supra), and is ruled thereby."
In view of the authorities already cited, and of the plain reason and
justice of the case, we are of opinion that the bill of the plaintiff must be
sustained and the injunction granted as prayed for.
The brief abstract from Churchman v. Cain, 4 Delaware Co. 378,
cited 4 P & L. Dec. 6765, appears to be somewhat at variance with this
conclusion, but is hardly sufficient to justify us in disregarding the
authority of the cases cited above.
Injunction granted.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The case stated avers that the deed from Aked to Tombs "stipulated" that only brick buildings, not nearer than ten feet, etc., should be
erected. If the stipulation were a condition only, the breach of it in the
absence of a provision that it should inure to the benefit of an alienee,
Kissick vs. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140, would entitle Aked and his heirs to
re-enter; but not his aliences. But the courts are prone to see in such
conditions something more. In them there is an implied covenant that
the grantee will not violate the condition. He has not an option to violate it and suffer an ejection from the premises, by his grantor. This
would not be an adequate remedy, for the grantor's grantee of other
parts of the premises.
Nor, regarding the condition as a covenant, is the remedy for damages deemed so far adequate, as to be exclusive. The covenantor will
be compelled by a court of equity, specifically to perform the covenant
by an injunction against the acts which would be a violation of it. Landell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 327; Allen v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 339; Electric
City Land Co. v. West Ridge Coal Co., 187 Pa. 500.
That the stipulations are so far reasonable as to merit the protection
of the courts, is unquestionable. Similar provisions have been often enforced.
Appeal dismissed.

BOOK REVIEWS.
The Law of Sales, by FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, 2d edition,
revised. West Publishing Conipahy, St. Paul, Minn. 1908..
The so-called Horn-Book series, published by the West Publishing
Company, contains many excellent treatises for students, a few of which
worthy of special mention are those on Contracts, Corporations, Insurance, Criminal Law, Torts, and Evidence. One of the best is Tiffany on
Sales, whose great merits have been tested by a twelve year's trial in
many law schools, and by many private students of the law. The revised
second
edition
contains at least 180 more pages than the first edition. It
gives the
English
Sales of Goods Act, and the Sales Act which has been
adopted in some American states and which will probably be enacted in a
large majority, if not all, of them.
The mechanical execution of the book is all that could be desired.

Clear type, on good paper, and a substantial buckram binding, give it an

inviting aspect. To those who are familiar with the earlier edition it is
unnecessary to expatiate upon the exceptional excellence of this text
book. Frequent testing has convinced us of its accuracy. Its style is
lucid, while terse, and one who familiarizes himself with its contents will
have a very comprehensive as well as definite knowledge of the extremely important branch of the law, of which it treats. Practitioners would
do well to have it at hand, and to refresh their memories of the principles found in it, by frequent reference.

